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Abstract
We develop a structural model of an industry with many entrepreneurial firms
in order to investigate the cyclical behaviour of aggregate fixed investment, variable
capital investment and output. In particular, we consider an environment in which
the entrepreneur cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral and cannot
sell fixed capital without liquidating her whole business. We show that, when these
entrepreneurs experience persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, the inter-
play between financing constraints and irreversibility of fixed capital is essential to
explain several common observations. It helps to explain why inventory investment
is very volatile and procyclical, especially during recessions, and why the output
and inventories of small firms are more volatile and more cyclical than that of large
firms. The model is also consistent with the observations that inventory investment
leads the business cycle, and that both fixed and inventory investment are sensitive
to the net worth of firms, even when marginal productivity of capital is taken into
account.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the eﬀects of financing constraints on the cyclical fluctuations of invest-
ment in fixed capital, variable capital and output. We develop a structural dynamic model
of an entrepreneurial firm who is subject to both borrowing constraints and irreversibility
of fixed capital. We use the model to simulate industry dynamics with heterogeneous
entrepreneurs who experience both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, and we illus-
trate how the irreversibility of fixed capital amplifies the eﬀect of financing constraints on
variable capital investment. Such amplification eﬀect is both quantitatively and qualita-
tively important. In particular it helps to explain why aggregate inventory investment is
very volatile and procyclical, and why the drop in inventories accounts for a large part of
the decline in business spending in recessions.
This paper is motivated by a large body of theoretical literature which has shown that
asymmetric information and contract incompleteness may prevent firms to access external
finance and make them unable to fund profitable investment opportunities1. Are these
imperfections relevant for the investment decisions of firms? To what extent they aﬀect
aggregate investment and production dynamics over the business cycle?
Most of the existing empirical literature, following the seminal paper by Fazzari, Hub-
bard and Petersen (1988)2, addresses only the first question. It shows that investment
is significantly correlated to cash flow, especially for firms likely to face capital markets
imperfections. but the relevance of this finding has been seriously questioned. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997 and 2000) find that the investment-cash flow correlation is stronger
for firms which are financially very wealthy and, according to their selection criteria,
surely not financially constrained3. Gomes (2001) and Ericson and Whited (2001) show
that measurement errors are the most likely cause of the positive correlation between
investment and cash flow.
The approach we follow in this paper is instead to develop a structural model of firm
behaviour under financing and irreversibility constraints, and to use the model to address
both questions regarding the eﬀect of financing constraints at firm level and the conse-
quences for aggregate investment and output dynamics. The model has three distinctive
features. First, output is produced by an entrepreneur who operates a concave risky tech-
nology using two complementary factors of production, fixed and variable capital. Both
factors take one period to produce output. Fixed capital cannot be disinvested unless the
whole business is sold. Second, the entrepreneur’s only source of external finance is debt
secured by collateral asset. Therefore her borrowing capacity depends on the value of her
assets. Third, the entrepreneur is risk averse and discounts future consumption at a rate
higher than the market interest rate. This implies that she never accumulates enough
financial wealth to eliminate the chances to face borrowing constraints.
It is well known that future expected financing constraints may aﬀect current con-
sumption decisions (see Zeldes, 1989, and Carroll, 2001). In this paper we show that,
1Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor (1986), Milde and Riley (1988), Hart and Moore
(1998), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2000).
2See Hubbard (1998) for a review of this literature.
3Similar evidence is produced by Cleary (1999), who studies a larger sample of 1317 US firms.
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for an entrepreneurial firm, future expected financing constraints also significantly aﬀect
investment decisions: anticipating a risk of binding financing constraints in the future,
the entrepreneur reduces the investment spending in the risky technology, and keeps some
financial assets (or spare borrowing capacity) as precautionary saving motive.
More importantly we show that the eﬀect of current and future expected financing
constraints on variable capital are amplified when fixed capital is irreversible. Consider
for example an entrepreneur who faces a persistent negative productivity shock. She
would like to reduce the amount of wealth invested in the risky technology, which is likely
to have a low return for a while. Since fixed capital is irreversible, she cannot reduce it,
and as a consequence she expects a lower return on her assets due to the ineﬃciently high
level of fixed capital. If the productivity will keep being low for a while, her financial
wealth will decrease rapidly, until she may become financially constrained. Anticipating
this possibility, she tries to reduce the exposure to the risky technology and to increase
the share of her wealth invested in risk free assets, but she can do this only by reducing
her variable capital investment, before she becomes actually constrained to do so. Hence
following a negative productivity shock variable capital drops more than it would have
done if fixed capital were reversible. This overshooting of variable capital is very large
when, after a particularly large or prolonged negative shock, both constraints are contem-
poraneously binding: in this case not only fixed capital is ineﬃciently high, but due to a
binding financing constraint variable capital is constrained to be ineﬃciently low. There-
fore not only the volatility of variable capital increases, but expected returns decrease
dramatically, due to the unbalanced use of factors of production, and this increases the
probability that the entrepreneur will face financing constraints also in the future.
When the bad period ends and productivity start to rise, the entrepreneur is very
cautious in investing in fixed capital, given the high cost of the irreversibility constraint in
case of a new negative productivity shock in the future. Thus she mainly invests in variable
capital, which overshoots upwards. This discussion illustrates that the combination of
irreversibility and financing constraints greatly amplifies the volatility of variable capital
relative to fixed capital, and hence also relative to output. Such amplification eﬀect is
more severe for smaller firms, which are more likely to suﬀer from both irreversibility and
financing constraints4.
The other important implication of the model is that the fluctuations in investment,
especially in variable capital, are partly driven by net worth fluctuations, even when
expected productivity is properly accounted for5.
In the paper we quantify the implications of these eﬀects for firm dynamics by simu-
lating an artificial economy with many heterogeneous entrepreneurs. The cross-sectional
distribution of net worth and fixed capital among entrepreneurs is determined by both
idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, and it aﬀects the way aggregate output and in-
4In fact a large multi-establishment firm could avoid the irreversibility of fixed capital simply by
shutting down some of the plants, and it is also less likely to face the informational and contractual
problem that prevent a smaller firm to access financial markets.
5In reality investment, productivity and net worth are highly correlated in the business cycles, even in
the absence of financing imperfections. Hence we mean that financing imperfections in our model imply
that investment is very sensitive to net worth even conditional on the productivity shock.
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vestment react to aggregate shocks.
Despite the model is relatively stylised, we are able to use it to explain the observed
dynamics of aggregate investment and output, and of small firms as opposed to large
firms. In fact because of the time lag for the installed fixed and variable capital to produce
output, the stock of variable capital at the end of one period has a natural interpretation
as input inventories, such as raw materials and work in progress. Likewise the change in
the stock of variable capital can be interpreted as inventory investment.
Moreover, even though the entrepreneurs in the simulated economy are ex ante all
identical, in equilibrium the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs with respect to the net worth
implies that entrepreneurs with smaller businesses are on average more financially con-
strained. This is because they became small after experiencing low productive periods
recently, and tend to have smaller net worth relative to output.
We calibrate the model using the long run averages of a four digit US industrial sector,
with annual data from 1962 to 1996. We also directly estimate from the same sector the
moments of the distribution of the productivity shock, and use them to simulate, for
many periods, several artificial economies, with and without financing imperfections and
irreversibility of fixed capital.
The comparison of the simulated data with the empirical data show that the inter-
actions between financing and irreversibility constraints are able to explain why the US
manufacturing data show that aggregate inventory investment is much more volatile and
procyclical than fixed investment, and that during downturns it accounts for a large
part of the drop in business spending. This is an important result because the excessive
volatility of inventories is a stylised fact that has recently received considerable attention,
because of its importance in business cycle dynamics, and because the drop in inventories
accounts for a large part of the GDP decline in recessions6 (Ramey and West, 1999). The
choice of explaining these stylised facts focusing on input rather than output inventories
is supported by Ramey (1989), who shows that input inventories are larger and much
more volatile than finished goods inventories during recent US recessions.
Moreover the interaction between the financing and irreversibility constraints implies
that inventory investment, at firm level, is more sensitive than fixed investment to the
availability of internal finance, even conditional on expected productivity. This result is
consistent with a study which shows that ”inventory investment for small firms absorb
from 15% to 40% of cash flow fluctuations” (Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen, 1998).
The model is also able to match the observed fact that inventory investment leads the
fluctuations in output (Stock andWatson, 1998), and that small firms are more procyclical
than large ones in inventories and output. This result is consistent with Kashap, Lamont
and Stein (1994), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), who
compare the behaviour of small versus large manufacturing firms after Romer dates, that
represent episodes of tight monetary policy that led to a recession7.
6Stock and Watson (1998) report that ”Changes in business inventories, which constitute but a small
fraction of total GDP, account for one-fourth of the cyclical movements in GDP”. In addition of being
procyclical at business cycle frequencies, Hornstein (1998) shows that fluctuations of GDP at frequency
shorter than business cycle are almost entirely driven by changes in inventories.
7Moreover Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) show that one third of aggregate fluctuations in the
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As a robustness check of the ability of the model to explain investment dynamics, we
also simulate the artificial economy with the same sequence of aggregate shocks estimated
from the annual data, from 1962 to 1986, of the chosen US manufacturing sector . We
find that the presence of both financing and irreversibility constraints improves the ability
of the model to predict empirical data, in particular the large drop in variable capital and
inventories during the recession in the beginning of the ’80s.
Finally, in the last section of the paper we briefly illustrate some empirical evidence
in favour of the assumption of financing constraints at firm level. We describe the results
obtained by Caggese (2003), who analyses a data-set of small and medium sized Italian
manufacturing firms, which includes both balance sheet data and qualitative response
data about entrepreneurs’ financing problems. Caggese (2003) shows that the premium
of productivity of variable capital over the cost of capital, which our model predicts to be
the best indicator of the intensity of financing constraints, is strongly positively correlated
with the likelihood that the entrepreneurs state problems in obtaining external funds to
finance new investment projects.
Three recent papers adopt a similar approach to our paper, and analyse an economy
with heterogenous entrepreneurs where financing constraints are binding for a fraction of
them in equilibrium: Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cooley Quadrini and Marimon (2002)
and Gomes (2001). Cooley and Quadrini (2001) show that financing imperfections in a
model of industry dynamics help to explain a stilised fact regarding growth dynamics of
firms which was not explained by models based only on technological shocks. Cooley,
Quadrini and Marimon (2002) focus on financing imperfections in the context of long
term contracts between firms and banks. They show that imperfect enforceability makes
the diﬀusion of new technologies sluggish and amplifies their impact on aggregate output.
Gomes (2001) builds a model with heterogeneous firms and financing constraints that
replicates some stylised facts about industry dynamics and shows that cash flow is not
significant in reduced form investment regressions when average Q is properly measured.
Moreover our paper is also related to the real option theory literature, and in particular
to Bertola and Caballero (1994).
Our paper is substantially diﬀerent from all those above, because we focus on the inter-
actions between financing and irreversibility constraints, and on business cycle dynamics
rather than growth dynamics of firms. Moreover we analyse a multifactor technology and
use the model to explain the empirical evidence about both fixed and inventory invest-
ment. Thus our paper provides an added value with respect to the existing literature on
several important aspects: we model theoretically and quantify with calibrations the ef-
fects of precautionary saving on the risky investment of an entrepreneurial firm. We model
theoretically an amplification eﬀect between irreversibility and financing constraints and
show that such eﬀect is essential to explain several stylised facts regarding business cycle
dynamics of aggregate investment. In this respect we complement and extend the findings
of Bertola and Caballero (1994), , who only focus on the eﬀects of irreversibility at firm
level on the behaviour of aggregate fixed investment.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 illustrates the theoretical model; section 3
US manufacturing sector can be accounted for by the diﬀerence between small and large firms.
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describes the solution method and simulation results; section 4 presents the conclusions.
2 The model
We consider an economy populated by many infinitely lived entrepreneurs, some active
and some retired, and many competitive banks. We assume that each active entrepreneur
(henceforth E) chooses consumption and investment in order to maximise the expected
value of her lifetime utility function. All entrepreneurs have same preferences and have
access to the same technology. Utility from consumption is measured by a concave function
U (xt) , where xt is consumption at time t.
U 0 (.) > 0; U 00(.) < 0; U 0(0) =∞; U 0(∞) = 0 (1)
E0s subjective discount rate β is such that:
βR < 1
where R = 1 + r, and r is the lending/borrowing interest rate. This implies that E is
impatient8, and that she chooses her optimal capital structure balancing her desire to
borrow in order to anticipate consumption with her desire to save in order to avoid future
borrowing constraints.
Regarding the technology, we assume that E can invest in the risky technology of
the business she owns and manages. kt and lt are respectively the stock of fixed and
variable capital, installed at or before time t − 1, which will generate output at time t.
Variable capital represents variable inputs such as raw materials and work in progress,
while fixed capital represents fixed inputs such as plant and equipment. The time to build
assumption implies that borrowing constraints are relevant when E needs additional funds
to exploit new investment opportunities. It also allows us to interpret lt as end of period
t− 1 inventories of variable capital. Output yt is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
yt = e
θtkαt
¡
lt + l
E
¢κ
with α > 0;κ > 0;α+ κ < 1 (2)
lE is a small fixed amount of variable capital supplied9 each period by E. θt is the
productivity shock. All prices are assumed constant and normalised to 1. Regarding the
factors of production, variable capital is non-durable, while fixed capital is durable:
1 = δl > δk (3)
δl and δk are respectively the depreciation factors of variable and fixed capital10. Moreover
fixed capital is reversible, while fixed capital is irreversible, and can only be disinvested if
E sells her whole business. In this case she cannot start a new business and must retire.
The retired E simply manages her wealth until she dies.
8Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) show that such feature arise endogenously in a general equilibrium model
with heterogenous agents and financing imperfections.
9It can be interpreted as E’s eﬀortless labour supply.
10Full depreciation of variable capital is not necessary, but it simplifies the exposition.
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Irreversibility of fixed capital is justified by the fact that in many industries plant
and equipment do not have a secondary market because they cannot be easily converted
to other productions. Yet we allow fixed capital to be used as collateral by assuming
that such conversion is easier if the whole of the assets is sold. The assumption that
fixed capital is irreversible conditional on the continuation of the activity is consistent
with the empirical evidence on a very large sample of US manufacturing plants analysed
by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995). Therefore conditional on continuation E is
subject to the following constraints:
kt+1 ≥ (1− δk) kt (4)
lt+1 ≥ 0 (5)
The productivity shock θt is assumed to follow a stationary autoregressive stochastic
process:
θt = θ + ρθt−1 + ζt; with 0 ≤ ρ < 1 (6)
ζt ∼ iid
¡
0,σ2ζ
¢
We introduce in the problem financial markets imperfections assuming that equity finance
and risky debt are not available. At time t E can borrow from (and lend to) the banks
one period debt, with face value bt+1, at the market riskless rate r. A positive (negative)
bt+1 indicates that E is a net borrower (lender). Banks only lend secured debt, and the
only collateral they accept is the next period residual value of physical capital. Therefore
at time t the amount of borrowing is limited by the following constraint11:
bt+1 ≤ τkkt+1 (7)
τk is the share of fixed capital value that can be used as collateral12:
τk ≤ 1− δk (8)
From (3) and (8) it follows that τ l = 0. The timing of the model is represented in
figure 1: E inherits from time t− 1 the stocks of fixed and variable capital kt and lt, and
the stock of debt bt. Then θt is realised, yt is produced and bt repaid. Residual wealth wt
is:
wt = yt + (1− δk)kt − bt (9)
After producing E dies with probability 1-γ. If she survives, she either retires or continues
activity. Retirement can happen for two diﬀerent reasons: i) E must retire after having
11The rationale for assumptions f1-f3 is that E can hide the revenues from the production. Being
unable to observe such revenues the lenders can only claim, as repayment of the debt, the value of E’s
physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1998). Therefore E can only lend or borrow one period secured debt
at the market interest rate r oﬀered by the banks. We also implicitly assume that in any default and
renegotiation of the debt with the bank E has all the bargaining power. Otherwise the bank could use
the threat of liquidation of fixed capital to enforce the repayment of uncollateralised debt.
12τk < 1− δk can be motivated by assuming that E can ’steal’ a 1− τk fraction of the residual value
of capital.
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Figure 1: The timing of the model
Time t Time t+1
Shock θt is 
realised 
E receives 
yt and  
repays bt, 
residual 
net wealth 
is wt 
With prob. 
γ E is alive 
With prob. 
1-γ E dies 
E continues: consumes xt , 
and decides kt+1 and lt+1 Shock θt+1is 
realised 
Time t-1 
E either decides to retire,  
or must sell the firm to  be 
able to repay bt               (*) 
E exits from production and 
lives of her wealth wt until 
she dies 
(*) Assumptions 1 and 2 rule this outcome out of the 
set of optimal choices 
E consumes 
xt-1 and 
decides kt and 
lt 
sold the business to repay bt; ii) E chooses to retire because the liquidation value of the
assets is greater than the continuation value of the business.
The interaction between financing and irreversibility constraints implies that forced
and voluntary retirement can happen in equilibrium. Intuitively because after a negative
shock E may be forced to sell the fixed assets to repay the debt. But even if she manages
to repay the debt without being forced to sell the assets and retire, she may be left with no
funds to invest in variable capital, and hence unable to generate output. If the negative
shock is persistent, then the expected return from the risky technology may be lower
than the expected return from selling the assets and retire. While this is an interesting
intuition to explore in future research, it goes beyond the scope of this paper. Here we
simply notice that the presence of endogenous retirement implies that the discount factor
of the problem becomes endogenous as well, and this makes the dynamic maximisation
problem extremely diﬃcult to solve, even numerically. Therefore in order to simplify
the analysis we restrict the set of parameters in order to rule out forced and voluntary
retirement from the set of possible outcomes. More specifically, we assume the following:
Assumption 1: lE ≥ lEmin (Θ)
Assumption 2: w0, θ, ρ and σ2ζ are such that: i) the net present value of the expected
utility from consumption is always higher conditional on continuing activity than on
retiring; ii) constraint (5) is never binding with equality.
Θ is the vector of parameters: Θ0 =
©
θ, ρ,σ2ζ , β, R, δk, τk, l
E
ª
. Assumptions 1 and 2
imply that E does not retire voluntarily, and is never forced to retire, and that it is never
optimal to sell part of lE rather than using it in her own production (proof in Appendix
A). lEmin is defined in equation (40) of Appendix A. It represents the minimum amount of
lE that always allows E to generate enough revenues to repay the debt without liquidating
kt. Therefore she is never forced to retire. Assumption 2 ensures that an active E never
voluntary retires. It is important to note that assumptions 1 and 2 do not aﬀect the
qualitative results of the model. In fact they rule out the extreme outcomes that would
increase the expected cost of irreversibility and financing constraints, and hence would
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strengthen rather than weaken model’s results.
The continuing E borrows new one period debt with face value bt+1, receiving the
discounted value bt+1/R. The net worth wt plus the new borrowing bt+1/R are allocated
between consumption and investment. Therefore the budget constraint faced by E is the
following:
xt + lt+1 + kt+1 = wt + bt+1/R (10)
We denote the expected lifetime utility at time t of an active E, after θt is realised, by
Vt (wt, θt, kt | Θ, w0, k0, θ0), where wt, θt and kt are the three state variables of the problem.
V0 (w0, θ0, k0) = MAX


kt+1 = k (wt, θt, kt)
lt+1 = l (wt, θt, kt)
bt+1 = b (wt, θt, kt)


t=0,1,...∞
E0
( ∞X
t=0
βtU (xt)
)
(11)
The problem is defined by (11) subject to (4) (5) , (7) and (10). These constraints define
a compact and convex feasibility set for lt+1, kt+1, bt+1 and xt, and the law of motion
of wt+1 conditional on wt, kt and θt is continuous. Therefore, given the assumptions on
θt and the concavity of the production function, a solution to the problem exists and is
unique13.
Let µt and λt be the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the constraints (4) and
(7). Taking the first order conditions of (11) with respect to bt+1, lt+1 and kt+1 it is
possible to show that the solution of the problem is given by the optimal sequence of
{kt+1, lt+1, xt,λt, µt | kt, wt, θt,Θ}∞t=0 that satisfies (4), (12), (13), (14) and (15), plus the
standard complementary slackness conditions on λt and µt:
U 0 (xt) = βREt [U 0 (xt+1)] +Rλt (12)
U 0 (xt) = βEt [U 0 (xt+1) (MPKt+1 + 1− δ)] + µt + λtτk − β (1− δk)Et
¡
µt+1
¢
(13)
U 0 (xt) = βEt [U 0 (xt+1)MPLt+1] (14)
Dkkt+1 + lt+1 + xt ≤ wt (15)
Dk = 1 − τkR is the downpayment required to purchase one additional unit of fixed
capital. Equation (15) combines together the budget constraint (10) and the collateral
constraint (7) and implies that the downpayment necessary to buy kt+1, lt+1 and xt must
be lower than E’s net worth14. The term (1− δ) γβEt
¡
µt+1
¢
in equation (13) is the cost
of future expected irreversibility constraints. λt and µt are positive when respectively
the financing and the irreversibility constraint is binding, and are equal to zero otherwise.
Since it is not possible to obtain an analytical solution to this problem, in the next section
we will solve it using a numerical method, while in the remainder part of this section we
13See Stokey and Lucas (1989), Chapter 9.2.
14The optimal choices of k
will describe the main qualitative features of the model. We first analyse the solution
without financing problems, then we analyse the solution without irreversibility problems,
and finally we explain how the two problems interact together. In order to illustrate the
intuition of the model, let’s use (12) to rewrite (13) and (14) in the following way:
Et (MPKt+1) = UK+
1
Et [U 0 (xt+1)]
½
1
γβ
[(R− τk)λt − µt]− covxkt+1 + (1− δk)Et
¡
µt+1
¢¾
(16)
Et (MPLt+1) = UL+
1
Et [U 0 (xt+1)]
µ
1
γβ
Rλt − covxlt+1
¶
(17)
The first term on the right and side of (16) and (17) is the user cost of capital:
UK = R− (1− δ) ;UL = R (18)
while the remaining terms on the right hand side represent current and future expected
costs of financing and irreversibility constraints. covxk and covxl are the following covari-
ances:
covxkt+1 = cov [U
0 (xt+1) ,MPKt+1] (19)
covxlt+1 = cov [U
0 (xt+1) ,MPLt+1] (20)
2.1 Solution with the irreversibility problem only.
In this subsection we rule out current and future expected financing constraints by as-
suming that the entrepreneur can borrow upfront future expected earnings. Moreover we
also rule out risky debt, by assuming that the utility function is linear in consumption,
and that E discounts the future at the market interest rate:
U (xt) = xt; Rβ = 1
Hence the following transversality condition is also necessary:
lim
t→∞
βtbt = 0
These changes imply that we are considering a standard profit maximising problem
where E is never financially constrained and consumption and financing decisions are
irrelevant for investment choices. Therefore λt = covxkt+1 = cov
xl
t+1 = 0 for any t, and the
first order conditions (16) and (17) simplify to:
Et (MPKt+1) = UK + (1− δk)Et
¡
µt+1
¢
−Rµt (21)
Et (MPLt+1) = UL (22)
Equations (21) and (22) and constraint (4) determine µt, kt+1 and lt+1. They describe
the solution to a version of a well known irreversible investment problem (e.g. see Bertola
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and Caballero, 1994). The main diﬀerence with the irreversible investment literature is
that we allow for a reversible factor of production to be used in conjunction with the
irreversible one. The intuitive consequence is that lt+1, the reversible factor, is more
volatile than kt+1, the irreversible one, both after a positive and a negative shock15. This
does not necessarily imply that variable capital is volatile also in absolute terms. In fact
the more the two factors of production are complementary, the more the irreversibility of
fixed capital also reduces variable capital volatility.
2.2 Solution with financing constraints only
In this section we rule out current and future expected irreversibility constraints by as-
suming that both variable capital and fixed capital are reversible. Hence the irreversibility
constraint (4) no longer applies, and µt = Et
¡
µt+1
¢
= 0, for any t. Let’s first consider the
case without financing problems as well. In this case equations (16) and (17) reduce to:
Et (MPKt+1) = UK (23)
Et (MPLt+1) = UL (24)
Equation (12) evaluated at λt = 0 and equations (23) and (24) determine xt+1, kt+1 and
lt+1, the optimal levels of consumption and investment when E faces no constraints.
Let’s now consider the case with financing constraints. Equation (15) implies that
there exists a minimum level of net worth wt =w(θt, kt) such that E is not financially
constrained at time t, and (15) is not binding. Therefore there are two possibilities:
If wt ∈ (wmint , wt) then E is financially constrained . Equation (15) is binding with
equality and together with equations (12), (16) and (17) evaluated at µt = Et
¡
µt+1
¢
= 0
determine λt, xt, kt+1 and lt+1. In this situation E borrows up to the limit without
being able to exhaust all profitable investment opportunities. Intuitively (15) binding
with equality means that one additional unit of wealth allows E to increase either kt+1
by 1/Dk units, or lt+1 and xt by 1 unit. λt > 0 represents the shadow cost of not
being able to increase investment because of the lack of additional borrowing. Therefore
financing constraints aﬀect both investment and consumption decisions. More precisely,
by substituting recursively in equation (12) we obtain:
U 0 (xt) = R
∞X
j=0
(γβ)j Et (λt+j) (25)
15This is evident from the comparison between (21) and (22). After a negative productivity shock at
time t that reduces the marginal productivity of capital, E reduces lt+1, to ensure that (22) is satisfied.
When (4) is binding, kt+1 cannot be reduced, and as a consequence marginal productivity of capital is
lower than the user cost UK. This is compensated by a positive µt on the right hand side of (22). Instead
after a positive productivity shock E wants to invest more in both factors. Therefore (4) is not binding
and µt = 0. Instead Et
¡
µt+1
¢
> 0 because, applying the same reasoning made before, (4) can be binding
at time t+1 conditional on a future negative shock. The positive Et
¡
µt+1
¢
represents the cost associated
to future expected irreversibility. Such cost increases the required marginal productivity of fixed capital
Et (MPKt+1) , thereby reducing kt+1. Therefore kt+1 increases less than lt+1 after a positive shock.
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Equation (25) shows that expected marginal utility from consumption is increasing in
the shadow cost of current and future expected borrowing constraints. If wt ∈ [wt,∞)
then E is unconstrained today, but could face borrowing constraints in the future. Since
λt = µt = Et
¡
µt+1
¢
= 0 then (16) and (17) become:
Et (MPKt+1) = UK −
covxkt+1
Et [U 0 (xt+1)]
(26)
Et (MPLt+1) = UL−
covxlt+1
Et [U 0 (xt+1)]
(27)
Equations (12), (26) and (27) determine the optimal consumption xt and investment
kt+1 and lt+1.The covariances covxkt+1 and cov
xl
t+1 between marginal productivities and
marginal utility of consumption are negative, and become large in absolute value when
wt is small. This is because the closer is wt to wt, the more likely is that the borrowing
constraint will be binding in the future conditional on a negative productivity shock.
Hence such shock at the same time reduces marginal productivity of capital and increases
marginal utility of consumption (see equation 25). From (26) and (27) it is easy to see that
the more negative are covxk and covxl, the higher is the optimal marginal productivity of
capital and the lower are the optimal investment levels kt+1 and lt+1.Hence future expected
financing constraints reduce optimal investment choices of a risk averse E. It is well known
in consumption literature that financing constraints may reduce current consumption
because of a precautionary saving motive (see Zeldes, 1989 and Carroll, 2001). This is
to our knowledge the first paper to show the same eﬀect for investment choices. In the
next section we will show that, for realistic parameter choices, this precautionary saving
eﬀect on investment, is quantitatively relevant: between two identical entrepreneurs who
do not currently face borrowing constraints, the richer one invests in the risky technology
up to 18% more than the poorer one, the diﬀerence being entirely due to future expected
financing problems.
It is finally worth mentioning that financing constraints do not alter the optimal
mix between fixed and variable capital, when next period residual fixed capital is fully
collateralisable (a formal proof is in appendix B). The intuition is that the advantage of
fixed capital over variable capital for an unconstrained E (lower user cost) is identical to
the advantage for a constrained E (collateral value). This result means that current and
future expected financing problems aﬀect the trade oﬀ between safe and risky investment
but not necessarily the mix between assets in the risky investment. This result is reversed
when financing and irreversibility constraints coexist, as it is shown in the simulations in
section 3.
2.3 Solution with the financing and the irreversibility constraints.
We consider now the solution of the problem with both constraints. Figure 2 summarises
the diﬀerent types of optimal policy functions kt+1 (wt, kt | θt) and lt+1 (wt, kt | θt) in the
{kt, wt} space, conditional on a certain productivity shock. The black area on the top left
corresponds to a situation in which E is either forced to sell the firm to repay the debt,
or finds convenient to retire. This area is ruled out by assumptions 1 and 2. Instead of
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Figure 2: Policy functions for a given productivity shock
kt 
wt 
E retires 
Both constraints 
are binding 
Borrowing constraint 
is binding 
Irreversibility 
constraint is binding 
describing in detail such solutions, we focus only on the most interesting feature: the fact
that irreversibility and financing constraints interact and amplify each other. When both
constraints are binding, µt is determined by equation (16). By substituting recursively
we obtain:
µt =
∞X
j=0
(1− δ)j
·
Γt+1+j +
1
β
(R− τk)Et (λt+j)− covxkt+j
¸
(28)
Equation (28) shows that µt, the shadow cost of the irreversibility of fixed capital increases
in the present and expected costs of financing constraints. The term Γt+1+j on the right
hand side represents the expected cost of overinvestment in terms of expected marginal
utility:
Γt+1+j = Et [UK −MPKt+1+j]Et [U 0 (xt+1+j)] (29)
The term 1
γβ
(R− τk)Et (λt+j)−covxkt+j represents the direct16 additional cost of current
and future expected financing constraints. This implies that financing constraints amplify
the cost of irreversibility, and increase the cautious investment eﬀect on fixed capital. More
importantly, the reverse is also true: the irreversibility constraint increases the chances of
facing financing constraints now, because fixed capital cannot be liquidated, and also in
the future, because the unbalanced use of factors leads to lower wealth accumulation. As
a result the cost of future expected financing constraints is higher when fixed capital is
irreversible. A quantification of this amplification eﬀect is computed in the next section
in figure 7.
16An indirect cost of future expected financing constraints is also in Et [U 0 (xt+1+j)] ,which also in-
creases in λt+j+1.
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Figure 3: Summary statistics
 Output Fixed Inputs Variable Inputs 
Empirical Data* 4695 2319 3320 
Simulated Data** 4722 2259 3310 
* Average (1962-1995) values for the average firm in the Industrial Machinery Sector, at constant 1987 
prices; ** average values for an entrepreneur in the simulated economy.  
Empirical variables are measured as follows:  output is the value of industry shipments; fixed inputs are  
plant and equipment; variable inputs are total cost of materials and labour  plus changes in inventories.  
3 Numerical Solution and simulation
3.1 Model’s solution
We solve the dynamic nonlinear system of equations defined by (4), (12), (13), (14) and
(15) using a numerical method (see appendix C). Adding the subscript i to indicate the i-th
entrepreneur, the solution consists in the optimal policy functions ki,t+1 (wi,t, θi,t, ki,t) and
li,t+1 (wi,t, θi,t, ki,t) , the associated Lagrange multipliers λi,t (wi,t, θi,t, ki,t) and µi,t (wi,t, θi,t, ki,t)
and the value function Vi,t (wi,t, θi,t, ki,t).
Uncertainty regarding output is modeled in the following way:
yi,t = e
θi,tkαi,t
¡
li,t + l
E
¢κ
(30)
Where:
θi,t = θ
f
i,tεt
θ
f
i,t is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, and εt is the economy-wide demand shock
common to all entrepreneurs. Both are first order autoregressive stochastic processes with
autocorrelation coeﬃcients ρθ and ρε and variances σ
2
θ and σ
2
ε respectively. In practice θ
f
i,t
and εt are modeled as a two states and a 6 states symmetric Markow process respectively.
We calibrate the model to match the aggregate yearly data on output and capital stock
for the ”Industrial Machinery Sector” in the US from 1962 to 1995(source: NBER-CES
manufacturing industry database). Hence in this section the ability of the model to
explain the cyclical fluctuations of aggregate output and investment will be measured
by comparing the simulated statistics from the artificial economy with the correspond-
ing empirical data for the ”Industrial Machinery Sector”. This sector has been chosen
as a generic representative one, but the theoretical model can be applied to any other
sector where productive units use a combination of reversible and irreversible factors of
production17 and can be subject to borrowing constraints. The main advantage to use
a single four digits sector rather than the whole manufacturing industry is that we have
less aggregation problems in the empirical data.
Therefore we believe that the results obtained in this section, regarding the ability of
the model to explain firm dynamics, are robust: the chosen sector is populated by many
17It is not necessary for the result that the collateral is provided by the irreversible factor. Moreover
the results are quantitatively significant also when the depreciation rate of the irreversible factor is high,
as is the case, for example, of technology spending.
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Figure 4: Summary of parameters
 α = 0.09 ρθ = 0.45 
κ = 0.86 σθ = 0.11 
δ = 0.15 β = 1/(1+r) 
θ f = 0.643 γ = 0.99 
r = 0.03 τ = 0.7(1-δ) 
ρε = 0.91 lE 
σε = 0.024  
firms, 4963 according to the 1997 census of the manufacturing industry, the majority of
which are small firms: 63% of all the establishments have less than 20 employees, and
more than 95% of the firms have only one establishment. Therefore it is reasonable to
assume that a large share of these firms may be aﬀected by borrowing and irreversibility18
constraints, like the entrepreneurial businesses in the simulated artificial economy.
The chosen parameter values are reported in figure (4).The technological parameters
α,κ, δ and θ
f
(the unconditional expectation of θfi,t), given the chosen annual real interest
rate r = 3%, imply that the steady state level of output, fixed capital and variable capital
for an entrepreneur in the simulated economy match the same statistics for the average
firm in the US industrial machinery sector, as is shown in figure 3. The parameters of the
aggregate shock ρε and σε are directly estimated using the information, included in the
NBER dataset, about the total factor productivity growth. The parameters of the firm
specific shock ρθ and σθ are chosen conservatively with respect to the parameters adopted
in similar studies that analyse industry dynamics, like Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and
Gomes (2001)19.
Among the remaining parameters the value of lE implies that the variable inputs pro-
vided by the entrepreneur matter for around 10% of the average value of external inputs.
The value of β implies that β (1 + r) = 0.99 < 1, so that agents are impatient in their con-
sumption decisions. Finally, the value of τ implies that 70% of the residual fixed capital
is collateralisable.
The next three figures illustrate the policy functions for chosen values of θfi,t, εt and
ki,t. In figure 5 we plot ki,t+1 (wi,t) and li,t+1 (wi,t), which are the investment decisions as
a function of financial wealth, for a productive firm (θfi,t is high) in a recessive economy
(εt is the lowest among the six states of the world), for ki,t = 0 (irreversibility is not
binding). For very small wealth levels the financing constraint is currently binding, ad
the policy functions of fixed and variable capital are very steep. The kink in these two
functions represents the wealth level for which the borrowing constraint is no longer
18A large firm cound avoid irreversibility constraints simply by shutting down some of its establish-
ments.
19The comparison with these two studies is relevant given that both concern the same topic of our work
and both calibrate industry dynamics using yearly data. Gomes 2001 chooses the values of ρf = 0.62
and δf = 0.15, while Cooley and Quadrini 2001 choose higher standard deviation (δf = 0.28)but no
persistency ( ρf = 0). The results we obtan in this section are however robust to a wide range of such
parameters.
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Figure 5: Policy functions: high idiosyncratic shock and lowest aggregate shock.
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Figure 6: Policy functions: high idiosyncratic shock and highest aggregate shock.
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binding. After the kink optimal capital is still increasing in wealth, because the increase in
wealth decreases future expected financing problems. This ”precautionary saving eﬀect” is
quantitatively important. Consider two entrepreneurs identical in everything except that
their financial wealth, and both currently not financially constrained. Future expected
financing problems imply that the richer entrepreneur invests in the risky technology up
to 18% more than the poorer entrepreneur.
Figure 6 represents the policy functions for a productive firm (θfi,t is high) in a booming
economy (εt is the highest), with ki,t = 0. On the one hand the region with a binding
borrowing constraint is larger, given the high investment needs of E. On the other
hand when the borrowing constraint is not binding E has few future expected financing
problems. As a result the richer unconstrained entrepreneur invests only 11% more in the
risky technology with respect to the poorer one.
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Figure 7: On the left: policy functions for high idiosyncratic shock, lowest aggregate
shock and binding irreversibility constraint on fixed capital. On the right: present
discounted value of the cost of future expected borrowing constraints
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The left hand side of figure 7 represents an entrepreneur in the same situation as in
figure 5 but with ki,t = 9875. This entrepreneur has too much fixed capital given the
current state of the economy, and hence ki,t+1 is a flat line equal to (1− δ) ki,t, indicating
that the irreversibility constraint is binding. The consequence is that the region in which
the borrowing constraint is binding is now larger than in figure 5. Moreover when the
borrowing constraint is not binding both kt+1 and lt+1 are ineﬃciently high. Therefore if
there is a sequence of negative aggregate shocks, financial wealth decreases more rapidly
towards the binding constraints region, and variable capital declines faster as well, moving
leftward along the policy function schedule. The consequence is that variable capital is
more volatile than it is the case when fixed capital is reversible.
In order to quantify the amplification eﬀect of irreversibility on borrowing constraints,
it is useful to remember that, from equation (12):
∞X
j=1
βjEt (λt+j) =
U 0 (xi,t)−Rλi,t
R
(31)
Equation (31) shows that the discounted sum of the shadow cost of future expected
financing constraints, on the left hand side, can be computed using the information about
marginal utility of consumption and shadow cost of currently binding constraints at time
t . The right hand side of figure 7 illustrates the value
P∞
j=1 β
jEt (λt+j) as a function of
financial wealth, for an entrepreneur who suﬀers the worst possible shock20. We compare
two diﬀerent economies, with and without irreversibility of fixed capital. The figure shows
that the cost of future expected financing problems is much higher in the economy with
irreversibility of fixed capital. More importantly, this is true also when the borrowing
20the aggregate shock goes from the highest state to the lowest state and the firm specific shock goes
from high to low. This entrepreneur has the same level of fixed capital than in the left hand side of figure
7.
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constraint is not currently binding. This means that the irreversibility of fixed capital
amplifies not only current but also future expected borrowing constraints.
3.2 Dynamics of aggregate output and investment
We now use the model’s solution to simulate the investment and production path of many
heterogeneous entrepreneurs. The aim is to show how the combination of irreversibility
and financing constraints generates a behaviour of aggregate investment consistent with
the empirical evidence.
In the simulated economy, the behaviour of aggregate investment and production
depends on the heterogeneity of the entrepreneurs in terms of the state variables. All
entrepreneurs are identical ex ante, but each of them is subject to diﬀerent realisation of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock θfi,t, which is uncorrelated across entrepreneurs and
serially correlated for each entrepreneur. Therefore at time t entrepreneurs have diﬀerent
values of wi,t and ki,t, depending on
n
θ
f
i,j
ot
j=0
. The distribution of {wi,t, ki,t} at time t
depends on the parameters set Θ and on the aggregate shock εt.
The statistics illustrated in the remainder of this section are generated by the simu-
lation of an economy of 5000 firms, for 2000 periods. In each period the number of new
entrepreneurs is constant, since they are infinitely lived. Nevertheless the model could
be easily modified in order to allow finite lives and entry-exit dynamics. In this case
if we allowed new entrants to be less wealthy than the average surviving entrepreneur
we would increase the impact of borrowing constraints on investment dynamics. This
would increase quantitatively the importance of some of the findings in this section, but
would not modify them qualitatively. Therefore entry-exit dynamics are not necessary to
generate the main results of the paper21.
We simulate four diﬀerent economies corresponding to the four versions of the model
described in the previous section: without any constraint, with one of the two con-
straints only, and with both constraints. Figure 8 shows some statistics for the simulated
economies compared with the empirical data of the industrial machinery sector used to
calibrate the model. We choose to represent variable capital with the total cost of ma-
terials excluded energy. This is the empirical variable most similar to the definition of
variable capital we employed in our theoretical model22. We do not report any simulated
data about consumption in the economies without borrowing constraints, since in these
economies we impose, by construction, a separation between investment and consumption
decisions.
The last column of figure 8 shows that in the economy without constraints, not surpris-
ingly, aggregate capital and output have an implausibly large volatility. Such volatility is
smaller in the economy with the irreversibility constraint only, but it is still very far from
the empirical data23.
21Simulation results for artificial economies with entry-exit dynamics are available upon request.
22If we had the information about inventories in the diﬀerent stages of fabrication we could have
computed a more precise variable, which would have included only materials used in the period.
23This result is consistent with Bertola and Caballero (1994) who note that, when irreversibility of
capital is the only friction to firm level investment, a model of industry dynamics can replicate observed
investment volatility only with implausibly large level of the idiosyncratic shocks.
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Figure 8: Aggregate volatilities: comparison between empirical data and simulated data
 Empirical 
data 
Simulated data 
Variable  Both 
Constraints
Only 
financing 
constraint 
Only 
irreversibility 
constraint  
No 
constraints
Standard deviation of variable capital (lt) 7.6471 11.836 13.482 22.862 35.366 
Standard deviation of fixed capital (kt) 1.9822 7.035 12.570 14.489 35.366 
Standard deviation of of consumption (xt) n.a. 1.492 1.270 n.a. n.a. 
Standard deviation of  output (yt) 6.9263 10.682 12.413 21.018 33.489 
St. dev. of var. capital relative to output
 
Correlation between yt -yt-1 and lt+1- lt 
 
1.104 
 
0.2294 
0.3675 
1.105 
 
0.265 
1.081 
 
0.157 
1.091 
 
0.101 
1.059 
 
-0.056 
1. Cost of materials, excluded energy; 2. Real capital stock (plant + equipment); 3. Value of industry shipments; 4. lt+1- lt measured 
as change in cost of materials; 5.  lt+1- lt measured as inventory investment. 
On the contrary the volatilities of the economy simulated with both constraints are
much closer to the empirical volatilities. Fixed capital is less volatile in comparison
with the other simulated economies, while variable capital is relatively more volatile. To
understand this finding it is useful to remember that the irreversibility constraint induces a
cautious behaviour in fixed capital investment: the entrepreneur is less willing to increase
the size of her fixed assets because a future negative shock could make them ineﬃciently
large. Conditional on such negative shock too much fixed capital lowers profits and
cash flow, and this is particularly damaging when the entrepreneur also faces borrowing
constraints. As a consequence the entrepreneur is even more cautious in investing in fixed
capital when she faces both irreversibility and borrowing constraints.
The last two rows of figure 8 show that the economy with both constraints is the only
one among the four simulated economies to be able to match the empirical data across
two important dimensions: i) the volatility of variable capital relative to output; ii) the
correlation between lagged changes in sales and inventory investment.
Variable capital is relatively more volatile in the model with both constraints than in
the other simulated models, and in line with the empirical data. This is because in such
Figure 9: Distributional features
Simulated data 
Variable Both 
Constraints
Only 
financing 
constraint
Only 
irreversibility 
constraint 
No 
constraints
Avg % of firms with a binding borrowing constraint 36.3 58.2 0 0 
Avg % of firms with a binding irreversibility constraint 37.4 0 60.7 0 
Avg % of firms with both constraints binding 10.6 0 0 0 
Avg. ratio of debt over phisical assets 0.1115 0.1745 n.a. n.a. 
Avg. ratio of consumption over output 0.2602 0.2839 n.a. n.a 
 
and G7 countries (Ramey and West, 1999). The correlation is negative in the economy
without constraints because the productivity shock is mean reverting and hence it aﬀects
current output more than variable capital investment, which is a forward looking variable.
A positive correlation is present in the model with irreversibility only, because a positive
aggregate shock reduces the number of firms with a binding irreversibility constraint,
and hence increases the sensitivity of investment to future shocks. In the model with
financing constraints the correlation is also positive because a positive aggregate shock
increases financial wealth and therefore increases investment by reducing current and
future expected financing constraints. The sum of the two eﬀects implies that in the
economy with both constraints the correlation coeﬃcient is higher and closer to the value
observed in reality.
Figure 9 illustrates the main distributional features of the simulated economies. The
economy with both constraints has an average ratio of constrained firms of 46.9%, of which
10.6% also have the irreversibility constraint binding. This value averages a very volatile
ratio, which in some periods falls below 10%, when there are on average low investment
needs, and in other periods rises up to 80%.
Figure 10 quantifies the eﬀect of financing constraints on investment. We compute
the percentage change in optimal capital if wealth increases by 1%, other variables kept
constant. The calculation is reported only for productive entrepreneurs, defined as those
with an high idiosyncratic shock in a given period. Therefore the figure shows the elasticity
of investment to changes in financial wealth. For example an elasticity equal to 1.4
means that if the wealth of all productive entrepreneurs increases by 1%, keeping constant
expected productivity, their stock of capital increases by 1.4%. Such elasticity is equal
to zero in the economies without financing imperfections, where investment decisions are
not aﬀected by capital structure, and therefore these economies are omitted. Figure 10
shows that aggregate investment is positively aﬀected by changes in financial wealth in the
economies with financing constraints. Three results are particularly worth mentioning:
i) in the economy with both constraints variable capital is more sensitive to financial
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Figure 10: Elasticity of investment to financial wealth for a productive firm**, conditional
on the productivity shock and the level of fixed capital.
*No firm is in this category; ** A firm with a positive idiosyncratic productivity 
shock. 
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Figure 11: Volatility and procyclicality of aggregate investment
 All entrepreneurs Small entrepreneurs 
Volatilities relative to 
aggregate investment 
Empirical
data 
Both 
constr. 
Only irrev. 
constraint
Only borr. 
constraint
No constr. Both 
constr. 
Only 
irrev. 
constraint 
Only borr. 
constraint 
No 
constr. 
Fixed investment 2.497 3.491 3.684 5.080 3.061 3.859 2.276 3.506 3.007 
Inventory investment 14.7792 
16.9163 
12.859 6.931 10.149 4.040 10.650 3.585 4.902 4.024 
Drop of inventories in 
recessions1 
86%4 82% 79% 65.8% 64.1% 83.2% 75.2% 65% 67.2%
1. Absolute drop in inventories as a percentage of the absolute drop of aggregate capital (fixed+inventories) in 
recessions; 2. measured as change in cost of materials; 3. measured as inventory investment. 4. The empirical series are 
detrended, in order to make them comparable with the simulated series. Inventories are measured as total inventories. 
wealth than fixed capital26. This result is consistent with empirical evidence at firm
level (Carpenter Fazzari and Petersen, 1998). ii) Entrepreneurs who are not currently
financially constrained also show a positive elasticity around 10%. This is due to the
fact that the increase in wealth reduces future expected financing problems. This eﬀect is
small but not negligible, and it increases up to 20% at the beginning of expansion periods,
when entrepreneurs engage in precautionary saving given the uncertainty about how long
the expansion will be. iii) Entrepreneurs with both constraints are those with the highest
elasticity of variable capital investment with respect to wealth. This is especially true
for smaller entrepreneurs. These very high values of the elasticity explain why variable
capital is relatively more volatile in the economy with both constraints than in the other
simulated economies.
26This result is obtained despite the distortion caused by the presence of the minimum level of variable
capital lE supplied by the entrepreneur, which biases downwards the elasticity of variable investment
to financial wealth. This is why in the economy with only borrowing constraints fixed capital is more
sensitive to financial wealth than variable capital.
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Figure 11 summarises the aggregate consequences of financing and irreversibility con-
straints on investment volatility. As illustrated in the introduction, empirical evidence
on US data provided by Ramey (1989) and by Blinder and Maccini (1991), and on G7
countries provided by Ramey and West (1999) show that inventories, especially in raw
materials and work in progress, are very volatile and procyclical. This is especially true
during recessions, when they account for a large fraction of the drop in business spending.
Moreover Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) show that the drop in inventories during
recessions is more pronounced for smaller firms.
Figure 11 shows that the model with both constraints is consistent with all these
findings. The first two rows report the volatility of fixed and inventory investment relative
to the volatility of aggregate investment. Since in the model lt+1 can be interpreted as
the end of the period t stock of input inventories, for the simulated data we measure
inventory investment as the change in the stock of variable capital. For the empirical
data we follow the same strategy used in figure 8, and propose two alternative measures
of investment in input inventories: i) the change in the cost of materials, which coincides
with the theoretical variable and is also closely correlated to the unobservable investment
in materials inventories; ii) the investment in total inventories. The figure shows that
inventory investment is significantly more volatile in the economy with both constraints
than in any of the other simulated economies, and much closer to the empirical data.
Our simulations also provide a direct estimation of the relative importance of the
drop in inventories during recessions. We define as recessions the episodes of several
periods of decline in output (in real terms) which start when output is consistently above
trend (greater than 0.75 of the standard deviation of the trend deviations of output)
and end when output is below trend. We show not only that the aggregate drop in
inventories during recessions is larger for the economy with both constraints, but also that
the diﬀerence is driven by a larger drop in the inventories of smaller firms, consistently with
empirical evidence. Necessary element for this result is the amplification eﬀect between
irreversibility and financing constraints. During recessions some entrepreneurs suﬀer from
both constraints, and hence they are forced to cut dramatically investment in variable
capital. Small entrepreneurs are on average less rich, and suﬀer more of this problem.
The comparison with empirical data shows that once again the economy with both
constraints is the best performing one. However it must be noted that the value of 86%
computed for the empirical data is very volatile, being the average between 82% (for the
’69-’71 period) and 90% (for the ’79-’83 period).
Figure 12 reports some information about the correlation between output and invest-
ment. In the economies without irreversibility constraint (first four rows) output and
investment are contemporaneously correlated.This is natural since output directly de-
pends on the inputs through the production function. The correlation is relatively low
because inputs are decided one period in advance, based on the expected productivity
shock Et−1
³
θ
f
i,tεt
´
, while output depends on the realised shock θfi,tεt.
The economies with the irreversibility constraint (last four rows) show that variable
investment leads the fluctuations in output. This is because many entrepreneurs can-
not immediately adjust fixed capital following an aggregate shock, and hence also the
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Figure 12: Cross correlations between investment and output
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Figure 13: Growth rates of variable capital and output, comparison between empirical
data and simulated economies
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adjustment in output is a bit lagged with respect to the adjustment in variable capital.
This feature, which is more evident in the model with both constraints, is consistent with
empirical evidence of US business cycles (Stock and Watson, 1998).
3.2.1 Comparison with empirical aggregate data.
In figures 13-16 we directly compare the aggregate time series of the US Industrial Ma-
chinery Sector, between 1962 and 1986, with the time series computed using the simulated
economies. We used the data about total factor productivity to estimate the aggregate
productivity shock εt for the period 1962-1986. We then simulated the artificial economies
feeding into the simulation the shock estimated above. The aim is to compare the dynam-
ics of output and inventories predicted by the model with the ones observed in reality.
If financing and irreversibility constraints are important to explain investment volatility,
especially during recessions, then we expect the economy with both constraints to be more
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Figure 14: Fit between empirical and simulated growth rates of aggregate capital and
output
R2 of an OLS regression of the empirical growth rate on a constant and the corresponding 
simulated growth rate of variable capital 
 
 Simulated economies 
Growth rates of: Both Constraints Only borr. 
constraint 
Only irrev. 
constraint 
No  
constraints 
Fixed capital 0.220 0.030 0.130 0.001 
Variable capital 0.475 0.439 0.379 0.387 
Output 0.526 0.502 0.444 0.463 
 
consistent with empirical data, especially in recessionary periods. We focus on the period
from ’62 to ’86 which includes large swings in investment and output, as opposed to a less
volatile period from ’87 to ’96.
Figure 13 compares the growth rate of output and variable capital for the empirical
data and for three simulated economy: without constraints, with irreversibility only, and
with both constraints27. The economy with both constraints is closer to the empirical data.
The other two economies are much more volatile, especially the one without constraints.
This result confirms the statistics showed in figure (8).
Figure 14 quantifies the fit between empirical and simulated data: it reports the R2 of
OLS regressions with the observed growth rate of capital and output as independent
variable and the corresponding simulated growth rate and a constant as independent
variables. The economy with both constraints has the best fit with the empirical growth
rates. The gain in R2 is bigger for capital than for output, and this result supports the
validity of the main intuition of the model: the interactions between the two constraints
are useful in explaining the behaviour of firms in the business cycle, especially regarding
investment dynamics. The result is particularly relevant regarding variable capital. In
fact although the biggest gain in R2 regards fixed capital, this could be due to the fact
that the model with both constraints, by inducing a more cautious behaviour fixed capital
investment, captures the eﬀect of adjustment costs not included in the model.
Moreover if the model correctly represents empirical data, such ability to replicate
empirical growth rates should be more evident in years of large productivity shocks,
when the two constraints are more likely to be binding. This intuition is confirmed by
figure 1528, which compares empirical and simulated growth rates of variable capital. The
comparison is facilitated by the fact that the growth rates are rescaled using their standard
deviations in the ’62-’86 period. The model with both constraints is better in replicating
empirical data when growth rates are large, both during expansion and contraction phases.
27The economy with borrowing constraints only is omitted in order to make these graphics more
readable
28The graphic about output growth rates shows similar results, and is therefore omitted.
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Figure 15: Growth rates of variable capital (rescaled)
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This is especially true for the recession of the beginning of the ’80s, which is especially
underestimated by the model with irreversibility only, and for the expansion in the mid
’70s, which is especially overestimated by the model without constraints.
Unfortunately we do not have data available about small firms for the industrial sector
we used as a benchmark, and hence we cannot directly compare the ability of the model
to predict the behaviour of small as opposed to large firms in the period. Nonetheless our
simulation results can be compared to the empirical literature on the US manufacturing
sector. In particular to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) who show that small firms
are more volatile and procyclical than large ones both in inventories and output. Figure
16 is consistent with these findings, showing that in the economy with both constraints
small firms are more procyclical than large ones, both in downturns and upturns. The
same result is not obtained in the other two economies. The economy with irreversibility
only has the opposite result, while the economy without constraints has no diﬀerence
between small and large firms.
3.3 Empirical microeconomic evidence
In the above simulations we showed that the interaction between irreversibility and fi-
nancing constraints explains a number of stylised facts about the dynamics of aggregate
investment. An essential condition for the results derived above is the presence of fi-
nancing constraints on firm investment decisions. In this section we report some direct
empirical evidence of such constraints. The idea is simple: because variable capital in-
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Figure 16: Simulated growth rate of aggregate variable capital and diﬀerence in the
cumulative growth rates of small and large firms
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vestment is reversible, the ”premium” of expected marginal productivity over user cost of
variable capital reflects the tightness of current and future expected financing constraints.
In Caggese 2003 this premium is estimated using a unique dataset of 561 Italian manu-
facturing firms with both balance sheet and qualitative data. The sample contains the
following information: i) 11 years of balance sheet data available from 1982 to 1992. This
panel is a subset of the dataset produced by Centrale dei Bilanci, which is the largest
and most reliable source of data about Italian firms. ii) Qualitative information from the
First Mediocredito Centrale Survey on Small and Medium Italian Manufacturing Firms.
Among the information in the survey we have the statements from the entrepreneurs
about the financing problems they faced in the 1989-1991 period. Entrepreneurs were
asked whether they had any of the following problems regarding investment financing:
Q1) lack of collateral; Q2) lack of medium-long term financing; Q3) too high cost of
banking.
The premium in expected productivity of variable capital, which constitutes a fi-
nancing constraints indicator, is computed in Caggese (2003) as the diﬀerence between
expected marginal productivity and user cost of variable capital. Using equation (17):
Et (Ψi,t+1) = Et (MPLi,t+1)− ULi,t (32)
Where:
Et (Ψi,t+1) =
1
Et [U 0 (xt+1)]
µ
1
γβ
Rλt − covxlt+1
¶
(33)
Et (Ψi,t+1) as defined in (33) is an indicator of the intensity of current and future expected
financing constraints. It is monotonously increasing in the shadow cost of being unable to
borrow to finance new investment. Equation (32) implies that such indicator can be esti-
mated as the diﬀerence between expected marginal productivity and user cost of capital.
In Caggese (2003) the empirical counterparts of ULi,t and Et (MPLi,t+1) are estimated
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using the panel of balance sheet data for Italian manufacturing firms, and an empirical
counterpart of Et (Ψi,t+1) , called tbΨwi,t+1, is obtained. The validity of tbΨwi,t+1 as an indicator
of financing constraints is tested using the direct information about financing problems
available in the Mediocredito Centrale survey. Caggese (2003) considers the entrepreneurs
that stated problems in accessing external finance in the 1989-91 period (questions Q1,
Q2 and Q3). Such problems are directly related to the tbΨwi,t+1 variable. The bigger tbΨwi,t+1,
the higher the shadow value of additional funding for the i-th entrepreneur and the higher
the probability that she answers positively to one of the questions regarding financing
constraints. Among the 561 firms considered, 21.6% of their entrepreneurs indicate one
of the three problems in accessing bank credit during the 1989-1991 period. Using this
information 4 dichotomous variables, rationji with j = {1, 2, 3, 4} , are constructed. They
have value 0 if the i − th entrepreneur does not state any financing problem, 1 if she
answers positively to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively (j = 1, 2 and 3) or states
any of the three problems (j = 4). Figure 17 from Caggese (2003) shows the result of a
regression of rationji on Ψ
w
i , which is the average value of tbΨwi,t+1 in the period covered by
the Mediocredito Centrale survey:
rationji = α0 + α1Ψ
w
i + α2 dimi (34)
Ψwi =
1992P
t=1989
³
t
bΨwi,t+1´. The time interval used to compute Ψwi includes 1989, 1990 and
1991, the period which the questions refer to, and 1992, the year in which the questionnaire
has been compiled. dimi is the size of the ith firm in number of employees, included to
control for size eﬀects. The first column of figure 17 is relative to the whole sample and to
ration4i as dependent variable. The coeﬃcient relative to Ψ
w
i is positive and significant.
The second and third columns repeat the same regression for larger (more than 300
employees, 19% of the sample) and smaller (less than 300 employees, 81% of the sample)
firms.
In order to interpret this result, we note that this estimation is done under the assump-
tion that the productivity shock is stationary plus the condition that α + κ < 1. Hence
firms are assumed to be in diﬀerent steady state sizes, according to their fixed eﬀects Ai.
Each firm evolves around such steady state according to the realisations29 of its idiosyn-
cratic shock. Therefore the result illustrated in figure 17 is consistent with the assumption
that the higher the average size of firms, the less likely they are to face the informational
or contractual problems which causes the financing constraint (7). This assumption is
realistic as large Italian firms usually have strong links with financial intermediaries and
do not face tight borrowing constraints like the one represented by equation (7).
The strong correlation between rationji and Ψ
w
i for small and medium firms below
300 employees is confirmed by the probit regression results in figure 17. The last four
columns show that the Ψwi coeﬃcient is positive and strongly significant, especially for
the specification (j = 4) that pools together the three diﬀerent questions. This result
shows that tbΨwi,t+1 is a valid indicator of the intensity of financing constraints, supporting
the validity of our theoretical model and our empirical approach, and rejecting the view
29This stationarity assumption is reasonable in this context, given that the time series is 11 years only.
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Figure 17: Relation between stated financing problems and the financing constraints
indicator
Probit regression: i
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(0.0007) 
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(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.001) 
Obs with ration=0 341 70 271 341 310 296 
Obs with ration=1 
(% of total) 
92 
(21.2%) 
11 
(13.6%) 
81 
(23%) 
11 
(3.1%) 
42 
(11.9) 
56 
(15.9%) 
Total obs 433 81 352 352 352 352 
Standard error in parenthesis; 1: More than 300 employees; 2: Less than 300 employees; * Significant at 90% confidence level; 
** significant at 95% confidence level; *** significant at 99% confidence level; rationi = 1 if the entrepreneur stated financing 
constraints, and 0 otherwise; dimi = dimension in number of employees; ΨiW = premium in the expected productivity of variable 
capital; 
of eﬃcient financial markets30.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we illustrated a structural model of an entrepreneurial firm subject to both
borrowing constraints and irreversibility of fixed capital. The solution of the optimal
investment problem shows that not only expected productivity but also financing problems
aﬀect investment and saving decisions of the entrepreneurs. In particular the proportion
of wealth allocated to risky projects rather than safe assets is negatively aﬀected by
future expected financing constraints. This precautionary saving eﬀect is not negligible:
consider two entrepreneurs identical in everything except than in their endowment of
financial wealth. Our simulations show that the richer one may invest up to 18% more in
the risky technology than the poorer one, only because she expects less future expected
financing constraints.
More importantly we showed that irreversibility and financing problems are comple-
mentary: the irreversibility problem amplifies the eﬀect of financing constraints on vari-
able capital both during upturns and downturns. By simulating an artificial economy with
many heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we showed that this amplification eﬀect, which has
not been studied yet in the literature, is essential in explaining why aggregate inventory
investment is very volatile and procyclical, and why the drop in inventories accounts for a
large part of the decline in business spending in recessions. Our theory accounts also for
30This result is robust to possible biases induced by measurement errors, for at least three reasons: i) the
qualitative and quantitative information come from diﬀerent sources (see Caggese 2002 for a description
of the samples). This reduces the probability that those entrepreneurs that declare financing constraints
also manipulate their balance sheets data to show that their investment is ineﬃciently low; ii) we condition
for firms size, thus ruling out the possibility that Ψwi is on average higher for small firms, which are also
more likely to state financing constraints; iii) the result is not driven by sectorial diﬀerences: in Caggese
2002 it is shown that financing constraints are equally distributed in the diﬀerent industrial sectors.
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the observed fact that most of the volatility in aggregate inventories and output is created
by small firms, that inventory investment leads the business cycle, and that both fixed
and inventory investment are sensitive to the net worth, even when marginal productivity
of capital is taken into account.
Although all the simulations in the paper refer to one specific US four digits manu-
facturing sector, similar results could be obtained for any sector where productive units
satisfy the following assumptions: both financing and irreversibility constraints are binding
for a non negligible share of firms in equilibrium; firms produce output using a combina-
tion of reversible and an irreversible inputs. It is not necessary for the results that the
irreversible factor of production is also the source of collateral. Nor it is necessary that
variable capital fully depreciates. Moreover our parametrization implies that on average
around 45% of the entrepreneurs are financially constrained every period, but the re-
sults would hold also for other parametrizations which would generate a lower fraction of
financially constrained entrepreneurs. For example, we assume a logaritmic utility func-
tion with a unitary coeﬃcient of risk aversion. Using an higher value of the coeﬃcient of
risk aversion would imply that entrepreneurs engage in more precautionary saving. This
would lower the share of constrained entrepreneurs in equilibrium but would not change
the result, because the precautionary saving eﬀect has the same implication of currently
binding constraint for the quantitative results derived in the paper.
Finally, the model restricts its attention to entrepreneurial firms. We think that this
is not a necessary restriction, as analogous models could be developed to analise similar
issues on publicly owned companies. We rather believe that this is one of the strong
points of this paper. Hamilton (2000) notes that, as of 1997, business owners constituted
approximately 13% of non agricultural employees in the Unites States. This large class
of businesses is therefore responsible of both a large share of production and of wealth
accumulation in the economy. Hubbard and Gentry (2000) and Heaton and Lucas (2000)
study the eﬀect of entrepreneurial risk on aggregate saving and on the portfolio choices
of the private sector, while this is the first study to link the issue of entrepreneurial risk
to that of investment and output fluctuations of firms.
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Appendix A: proof of proposition 1
We assume that θt is a symmetric two state stochastic Markov process:
θt ∈ {θL, θH} with θH > θL; pr(θt+1 = θt) = ² > 0.5; pr(θt+1 6= θt) = 1− ²
(35)
Hence the first order autocorrelation coeﬃcient is ρ = 2²− 1 > 0, and we have that:
Et (θt+1 | θt = θH) > Et (θt+1 | θt = θL) (36)
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